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Introduction.
The celebrated Taylor (1993) Bernanke and Woodford (1997) , Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001a ,2001b ,2000a , Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000) , and Kerr and King (1996) . As forcefully argued by Evans and Honkapohja (2001) , sunspot equilibria are compelling only if they are not "fragile" to reasonable assumptions about "learning". We follow Evans and Honkapohja (2001) , and interpret "learning" as Estability, so that an equilibrium is "fragile" if it is not E-stable. The issue raised in this paper is whether the sunspot equilibria induced by some Taylor-rules are E-stable.
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A robust result of the papers on indeterminacy is that sunspots are most likely in cases in which the central bank responds to forecasted inflation. We will thus focus on Taylor rules in which the central bank responds to forecasted inflation. Honkapohja and Mitra (2001) analyze the basic monetary model considered here, and conclude that the sunspot equilibria arising from a forward-looking monetary policy are not E-stable. 4 They show that the only equilibria that are E-stable are the minimum state vector (msv) solutions where inflation depends only on fundamental shocks. McCallum (2001) concludes from this that only the msv solution is empirically relevant.
In this paper we consider two variants of the analysis in Honkapohja and Mitra (2001) and demonstrate the existence of E-stable sunspot equilibria. First, we consider a different timing scenario. A microfoundation of the model analyzed by Honkapohja and Mitra is that money balances at the end of goods market trading is what aids in transactions. Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001) refer to this as "cash-when-I'm-done" (CWID)
timing. In a model with CWID timing Honkapohja and Mitra demonstrate that sunspot equilibria are not E-stable. But CWID is a peculiar timing convention. In contrast,
suppose that cash balances held in advance of goods trading are the balances that aid in transactions, what Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001) call "cash-in-advance" (CIA) timing. One contribution of this paper is to demonstrate that in a model with CIA timing there exist Estable sunspot equilibria.
Our second modeling variation is a different assumption on the nature of learning. Honkapohja and Mitra (2001) The outline of the paper is as follows. In the next section we present the basic CWID monetary model and the results of Honkapohja and Mitra (2001) . We then consider the CIA variant of this model. Here sunspots can be learnable. In section 3, we demonstrate that sunspots are typically learnable when there is asymmetric learning and it is the central bank doing the learning. We also briefly discuss the limplications of different types of asymmetric information. Section 4 concludes.
I. Symmetric Learning in a Sticky Price Model.
A. Sunspots and Learnability in the CWID Model.
The analysis is conducted using the now-standard sticky price model that is given by the following two equations:
where
denotes the inflation rate from time t-1 to time t, z t denotes marginal cost, R t is the nominal interest rate between t and t+1, and u t denotes a shock to the 4 pricing equation.
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All variables are expressed as log deviations from the non-stochastic steady-state. Below we find it convenient to make the weak assumption that β+λ>1.
To close the model we need to specify the central bank reaction function. In what follows we assume a reaction function where the current nominal interest rate responds to expected inflation:
where τ > 0 is the response of the nominal interest rate to movements in expected inflation. Under any such interest rate policy the money supply (not modeled) responds endogenously to satisfy the interest rate rule. It is this endogeneity of the money supply that leads to the possibility of real indeterminacy and sunspot equilibria. That is, there is real indeterminacy if different money growth rules support the interest rate target (3). To proceed, use (1) to eliminate z t from the system:
Using (3) to eliminate the nominal rate, we have a second-order difference equation in π t .
For determinacy, we need both roots of the corresponding characteristic equation to be outside the unit circle. Straightforward calculations imply that there is real determinacy if and only if
For reasonable calibrations (β = .99, λ = .3), the upper bound is quite high, about 14, so that the basic conclusion is that a τ greater than unity will achieve determinacy. If there is determinacy, the equilibrium can be written as 
where α ∈ (-1,1) is unique, γ ≠ γ msv is unique, σ 1 and σ 2 are arbitrary, ε t+1 is the innovations in the u t process, and s t+1 is an arbitrary iid, mean-zero sunspot shock. Note that although the msv solution uniquely determines the response of π t+1 to ε t+1 , σ 1 is arbitrary in the case of sunspot equilibria because both ε t+1 and s t+1 are white noise.
Are these sunspot equilibria learnable? Following the methodology outlined in Evans and Honkapohja (2001) , posit the following perceived law of motion (PLM):
Notice that this PLM has the same form as the sunspot equilibria (5). Using this PLM scrolled forward to eliminate the forecasts in the equilibrium condition (4), we can then solve for the implied actual law of motion (ALM):
By replacing all expectations with this common PLM, we are assuming symmetric learning between the public and the central bank.
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We now have the mapping
The fixed points of this T-mapping are the rational expectations equilibria. An equilibrium is said to be E-stable if this mapping is stable evaluated at the equilibrium in question. Bullard and Mitra (2000) study the E-stability of the msv equilibrium.
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Our focus is on sunspot equilibria.
It is straightforward to demonstrate that if agents know π t when forecasting π t+1 and π t+2 , then the coefficient a 1 maps into zero so that the sunspot equilibria are not Estable. Hence, Honkapohja and Mitra (2001) extend the analysis by assuming that when forming expectations agents do not know π t , so that time-t forecasts are functions only of π t-1 and the exogenous shocks. As noted by Evans and Honkapohja (2001) , this increases the chances for E-stability. One contribution of Honkapohja and Mitra (2001) is to demonstrate that even in this case the sunspot equilibria are still not E-stable so that sunspots are not learnable. In the next section we will consider a particular form of asymmetric learning in which only the central bank is learning. In this case we replace only the central bank's forecast with the PLM. 8 It is important to note that our PLM does not include a constant term, while a constant term is central to the results in the Bullard-Mitra paper. 9 However, Honkapohja and Mitra (2001) demonstrate that a different type of equilibria, "resonant frequency" sunspot equilibria, may be learnable under certain policy rules.
B. Sunspots and Learnability in the CIA Model.
Before abandoning the possibility of E-stable sunspots in the case of symmetric learning, consider the alternative money-demand timing convention suggested by Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001) . The Fisher equation given by (2) 
As before we use (1) to eliminate z t from the system.
In this case Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001) demonstrate that there is real indeterminacy under the forward-looking Taylor rule for all values of τ. Are any of these sunspot equilibria E-stable? Yes, but only a few. We first characterize the indeterminacy, and then look at E-stability. 
where 0 < α < 1 is unique, γ is unique, and σ 1 and σ 2 are arbitrary. Proof: Since questions of determinacy depend only upon deterministic dynamics, the proof focuses only on the AR coefficients without loss of generality. The characteristic equation of (7) is given by
We have h(0) > 0, h'(0) < 0, and h(1) = λ(τ-1). Hence, if τ < 1 there is one root in (0,1) and one outside (0,1). Since there are no predetermined variables we have real indeterminacy. Now suppose that τ > 1. In this case we have h'(1) > 0. Hence, if the roots are real, they are both in (0,1). These two roots are both possible AR(1) coefficients.
Alternatively, we can write this as the AR (2) We will now turn to E-stability of these equilibria. If we assume that π t is known when generating forecasts the earlier discussion applies and the sunspot equilibria are not E-stable. Hence, we once again must restrict the information set by assuming that π t is not known when generating forecasts.
Proposition 2: Assume CIA timing and that π t is not observable for time-t forecasting. 
Under the assumption that π t is not observable for time-t forecasting, we have (7) we have that the PLM maps into the ALM via: Evans and Honkapohja (2001) , this implies that for Estability of the sunspot equilibria we need focus only on the mappings of a 1 and b 1 . The E-stability condition is that T 1 '(a 1 ) < 1 and T 2 '(b 1 ) < 1, evaluated at the sunspot equilibria. Consider a 1 first:
The AR(1) solution is α such that T 1 (α) = α. Using this fact we have that E-stability
It is straightforward to show that only the larger of the two real roots satisfies this condition. When τ < 1, the larger root is outside the unit circle so the AR(1) equilibria
are not E-stable. , the larger root is inside the unit circle so that a 1 = α high is E-stable. In this case, we must examine T'(b 1 ):
For stability, we need this within the unit circle. Using a 1 = α and T(α) = α we have 0 ) ( ) ( ) 1 (
We now analyze the case where τ > 1 so that we have AR (2) 
Using this PLM and the assumption that π t is not part of the information set, we have the following T-mapping from PLM to ALM: (7)) are real when ∆ > 0. If ∆ > 0, g(0) < 0 so that the two roots of g are below unity and we have E-stability. If ∆ < 0, the roots of g are complex, and we need the real part to be less than unity. Expressing this condition in terms of τ yields the expression in the proposition. QED Proposition 2 implies that the AR(2) sunspot equilibria are learnable for an empirically relevant range. For example, with β = .99, λ = .3, we have E-stability for 1 < τ < 5.44. This region includes the celebrated Taylor coefficient of 1.5.
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III. Asymmetric Learning in a Sticky Price Model.
The former section made an extreme assumption: both the public and the central bank have common forecasts, both of which are rational only in the limit. In contrast, in this section we assume that the private sector's forecasts are rational but that the central bank uses a forecasting rule that is rational only in the limit. In this case it is much more likely for real indeterminacy to be learnable. If the central bank uses current inflation to 11 Curiously, this range gets arbitrarily large as the economy approaches a flexible price model (λ→∞).
Yet for an economy which is perfectly flexible (so that equilibrium is given by (6) with z t = 0) there is real indeterminacy but sunspots are never learnable (this is immediate given that π t no longer enters into the system). This suggests there might be a problem in the above analysis. The problem may lie with Honkapohja and Mitra's (2001) assumption that when forming expectations agents do not know π t . But actual inflation in the pricing equation (1) was assumed observable. Following Yun (1996) the microfoundations of this pricing equation are that firms who set prices in time-t base their prices on the current price level and forecasts of future prices. If the current price level is assumed to be not observable, then presumably we should replace π t in equation (1) with the expectation of π t given current information. In this case we would have an actual law of motion (ALM) solely in π t-1 so that the coefficient a 1 maps into zero. (A similar argument holds in the case of the AR(2) equilibria.) Under this interpretation the sunspot forecast future inflation, and if the public knows that the central bank is doing so, then the AR(1) and AR(2) sunspot equilibria may be learnable. The central bank can lead the economy to indeterminacy.
A. The CWID Model.
Let us begin with the case of CWID timing. The relevant equilibrium is given by
The sunspot equilibria are of the AR(1) form in (8). Since only the central bank is subject to learning we substitute the PLM only into the bank's forecast:
As will soon be evident, because of the dynamics of asymmetric learning, the sunspot equilibira can be E-stable even if the central bank observes π t when forecasting π t+1 .
Without loss of generality, we thus proceed under this assumption. Notice that with asymmetric learning the forward rule with parameter τ corresponds to (roughly) a current rule with parameter τa 1 . Substituting (11) into (10), we have a second order system in π t .
This system is indeterminate, with one root in the unit circle. This root is the ALM.
Under this mapping, is the AR(1) coefficient ever E-stable? Yes.
Proposition 3: Assume CWID timing, and central bank learning. If τ < 1, then there is real indeterminacy and the AR(1) equilibria of the form (8) are E-stable. If
, then there is real indeterminacy but the AR(1) equilibria of the form (8) are not E-stable equilibria are not E-stable. This criticism does not apply to the analysis in Section III as we assume that π t is known when making forecasts.
Proof: Substituting (11) into (10), we have the following system:
In the neighborhood of the AR(1) equilibria, a 1 = α, this system is subject to indeterminacy so that we can use the method of undetermined coefficients to solve it for the ALM:
where without loss of generality we ignore the sunspot coefficients. The mapping T(a 1 ) is given by the stable root (the smaller root) of the system:
For E-stability we need this to be less than one. Exploiting the fact that T(α) = α, where α is the AR(1) solution, we can eliminate the square root and obtain:
We can now consider the two cases:
where the inequality follows from the restriction on τ. Since the AR(1) α < 0 in this case,
, so that the solution is not E-stable.
Case 2: τ < 1.
Expression (12) is increasing in α. Setting α = 1 we have
where the last inequality follows from τ < 1. Hence, we must proceed to the T(b 1 ) mapping:
For the case τ < 1 we have 0 < α < 1, so that T'(b 1 ) < 1. Hence, in the case of τ < 1 we have E-stability. QED
Remark:
It is curious to note that the sunspots fail to be E-stable only when τ is large so that the equilibria are oscillatory, α < 0. However, Honkapohja and Mitra (2001) demonstrate that the "resonant frequency" sunspot equilibria are learnable when the equilibria are oscillatory.
B. The CIA Model.
In the case of CIA timing, the relevant equilibrium is given by 
In the case of τ > 1, we have indeterminacy of the AR(2) form given in (9) 
We now state:
Proposition 4: Assume CIA timing, and asymmetric learning (central bank learning).
For τ < 1 the AR(1) equilibria in (8) are learnable if
For τ > 1 the AR(2) equilibria in (9) are learnable for all values of ρ.
Proof:
Case 1: τ τ τ τ < 1. Substitute (14) into (13). This system is indeterminate, with two positive roots, one in (0,1). This smaller root is the ALM and is given by T(a 1 ):
E-stability is given by dT(a 1 )/da 1 < 1. 
For τ < 1 this is always satisfied as α is the smaller root of the characteristic equation.
We now must turn to the b 1 coefficient:
where we are evaluating this at a 1 = α. For E-stability we need T'(b 1 ) < 1. Imposing this and using the fact that α is the root of the characteristic equation, we have
Combining this with (16), we have that the equilibria are learnable if and only if
Case 2: τ τ τ τ > 1. Substitute (15) into (13). This system is indeterminate and in the neighborhood of the candidate sunspot equilibria can be expressed as an AR(2). This AR(2) is our ALM:
We thus have the mapping
Inspection reveals that this is E-stable. QED C. Other Asymmetries.
The previous discussion has considered only one of the three possible asymmetric learning scenarios. In this section we briefly discuss the other two logical possibilities.
First, suppose that the central bank has rational expectations, but that the public is subject to learning. This case is easily dealt with. Since private sector expectations are part of bond-pricing, then the law of iterated expectations immediately implies that the analysis of this type of asymmetric learning will exactly parallel Section II's discussion of symmetric learning.
Second, suppose that both the central bank and the public are subject to learning, but that their learning is asymmetric. That is, the form of their PLM's are the same, but the initial coefficient values in these PLM's may differ. Matters are a bit more complicated here, but the appendix demonstrates that once again the E-stability conditions for this type of asymmetric learning are identical to the E-stability conditions for symmetric learning examined in Section II.
In summary, the only case in which asymmetric learning gives novel results (compared to the results on symmetric learning in Section II), in when the public has rational expectations while the central bank is subject to a learning process. As noted earlier, this is also the assumption that Sargent (1999) utilizes in his analysis of the great inflation.
IV. Conclusion.
This paper has shown that the developing consensus that policy-induced sunspots are not learnable may be premature. This paper has considered two modifications to the typical model, either one of which leads to the learnability of sunspot equilibria. First, if we replace CWID money demand timing with the more intuitive CIA timing, then sunspots are learnable over a relevant range of the parameter space. Second, sunspots are learnable if the central bank is the one doing the learning.
There are several natural areas of further work. First, the Taylor rule examined depended only on expected inflation. Future work will consider the case of including a measure of output in the policy rule. Second, the sunspot equilibria arise because of the endogeneity of the supporting money supply process. What features of this money supply behavior lead to E-stability? Finally, work by Fuerst (2000a, 2001b) suggests that sunspot equilibria are much more likely when investment spending is added to the model. Are any of these sunspot equilibria E-stable?
While addressing whether sunspots are learnable we have left unanswered the question of how a particular sunspot is coordinated upon. While far from being a complete answer to this important question we note that if the monetary authority believes in a particular sunspot, rational expectations on the part of the public dictates that they too will believe in that sunspot. The central bank can lead us to real indeterminacy. central bank expectations. We have omitted the stochastic shocks for simplicity and without loss of generality. In the case of CWID timing R t enters the Euler equation so that f 2 = -λτ and f 4 = 0 (see equation (4)), while in the case of CIA timing R t+1 is in the Euler equation so that f 2 = 0 and f 4 = -λτ (see equation (7)).
Let us consider AR(1) equilibria first. Suppose the sunspot equilibria are characterized by π t = γπ t-1 , where γ is in the unit circle. In the case of symmetric learning both the central bank and the public posit the same PLM, 
